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Abstract 
 
Information problems and lack of collateral value should make R&D more susceptible to financing 
frictions than other investments, yet existing evidence on whether financing constraints limit R&D is 
decidedly mixed, particularly in studies of non-U.S. firms.  We study a large sample of European firms 
and also find little evidence of binding finance constraints when we estimate standard investment-cash 
flow regressions.  However, we find strong evidence that the availability of finance matters for R&D once 
we directly control for:  i) firm efforts to smooth R&D with cash reserves, and ii) firm use of external 
equity finance.  Our study provides a framework for evaluating financing constraints when firms rely 
extensively on external finance and endogenously manage buffer stocks of liquidity to keep investment 
smooth, and our findings show that controlling for this smoothing behavior is critical for uncovering the 
full effect of financing constraints.  Our findings also indicate a major role for external equity in financing 
R&D, highlighting a causal channel through which stock market development and liberalization can 
promote economic growth by increasing firm-level innovative activity. 
 
1 
 
I.  Introduction 
R&D is a critical input for innovation and is thus a main driver of economic growth.  One key 
feature of R&D is that knowledge spills across firms and even countries, suggesting that socially optimal 
rates of R&D are likely much higher than privately optimal levels (see the survey by Hall, Mairesse and 
Mohnen (2010)).
1
  A second important feature of R&D is susceptibility to financing constraints: for 
several reasons – including lack of collateral value and asymmetric information problems – R&D may 
face significant adverse selection and moral hazard problems, particularly in younger and smaller firms.  
For such firms, financing constraints can drive R&D investment below the privately optimal level in a 
world of no financing frictions.  If financing constraints are binding for a sufficient number of firms, 
country- and world-wide R&D levels will be depressed, leading to lower levels of innovation and growth 
than would be possible in a world without financing frictions.  
Despite R&D’s critical role in economic growth and susceptibility to financing difficulties, 
comparatively few studies evaluate how financing frictions affect R&D, and the results in these studies 
are decidedly mixed. Furthermore, the evidence supporting economically important financing constraints 
on R&D is much stronger for U.S. firms compared to European firms, which is a puzzle, as capital 
markets in the U.S. are at least as developed as those in Europe.  For example, early studies by Hall 
(1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) report a strong positive relation between R&D and cash flow 
in U.S. manufacturing firms, and recent studies by Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) and Brown and 
Petersen (2009) find a strong link between R&D and both internal and external equity finance for young 
publicly traded U.S. firms.  On the other hand, Bond, Harhoff, and Van Reenen (2003) find that neither 
German firms nor U.K. firms display a correlation between the level of R&D and cash flow, and Harhoff 
(1998) finds a statistically significant but weak relation between R&D and cash flow for small and large 
German firms.  Hall, Mairesse, Branstetter and Crepon (1999) find that R&D is much more sensitive to 
cash flow in U.S. firms than in French and Japanese firms, and Mulkay, Hall and Mairesse (2001) report a 
much stronger R&D-cash flow sensitivity for U.S. firms relative to French firms.  Finally, Bhagat and 
Welch (1995) report no evidence of a positive R&D-cash flow link across firms in the U.S., Canada, 
                                                 
1
 R&D is now a central element of the endogenous growth literature (e.g., Romer (1990); Aghion and Howitt 
(1992)).  For evidence on R&D spillovers across countries, see Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (2009).   
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U.K., Continental Europe and Japan.  Hall and Lerner (2010) provide a comprehensive summary of the 
literature and conclude that it remains an open question whether financing constraints matter for R&D.   
In this study, we highlight two issues that are crucial for understanding and identifying financing 
constraints on R&D.  The first issue is firm use of external equity issues to finance R&D.  Stock issues 
have several advantages over debt (e.g., no collateral requirements, investors share in upside returns) for 
financing risky, intangible investments, consistent with the well-known fact that R&D-intensive firms 
make little use of debt finance (e.g., Hall (2002)).  As a consequence, even though external equity finance 
may be considerably more expensive than internal finance, stock issues are the main marginal source of 
R&D finance for many firms.  Given that firms make heavy use of stock issues primarily during the early 
stage of their life cycle (when cash flow is low and often negative), stock issues and cash flow tend to be 
negatively correlated.  This implies that not controlling for stock issues will lead to a downward bias in 
the estimated link between R&D and cash flow.   
The second issue is that high costs of adjusting R&D spending lead firms to aggressively buffer 
R&D from transitory volatility in internally generated cash flow.  The most plausible way for firms to 
maintain a smooth path of R&D spending is to build and employ buffer stocks of liquidity (e.g., cash 
reserves).
2
  We emphasize that a firm can display relatively little R&D sensitivity to finance shocks in the 
short-run (because of smoothing), yet over a longer time horizon be just as constrained as firms not 
engaging in smoothing.  The intuition is that smoothing does not change the long-run availability of 
finance: cash holdings depleted in the current period to buffer R&D must be rebuilt in future periods, 
displacing future finance for R&D.  If firms do actively smooth R&D from transitory shocks to finance, 
then within-firm regressions that ignore endogenous liquidity management will very likely generate 
downward biased estimates of the impact that shocks to finance have on R&D.  The potential for 
downward biases are particularly relevant in Europe, where labor laws can make adjustment costs for 
R&D especially large.  To address this potential bias we directly control for firm smoothing efforts by 
including changes in the firm’s stock of liquid assets (cash and equivalents) in the regression 
specification.     
                                                 
2
 Several studies show theoretically that cash reserves can benefit firms facing financing frictions.  In particular, 
Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2007) show that firms with “high hedging needs” will prefer building stocks of 
cash rather than debt capacity as a hedge against cash flow shortfalls.  Also see Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) 
and Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004).   
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To our knowledge, no previous studies explore how use of external finance and active R&D 
smoothing with cash holdings impact tests for the existence and importance of financing constraints on 
R&D.
3
  One contribution of our study is to show that accounting for these factors provides a more 
accurate measure of whether financing constraints matter for R&D and can dramatically alter the 
conclusions concerning whether financing constraints are important.  A second contribution is to provide 
sharper and more conclusive tests for the presence of binding financing constraints for R&D investment.  
In particular, if financing constraints matter for R&D, then we should observe:  i) a negative within-firm 
link between R&D and changes in cash holdings as firms draw on cash reserves for R&D smoothing, and 
ii) a substantial increase in the estimated impact that other financial factors have on R&D when changes 
in cash holdings are controlled for (revealing more of the long-run impact that access to finance has on 
investment). As we discuss in detail in the next section, collectively these findings are not subject to 
standard critiques of financing constraint studies, such as difficulties controlling for R&D investment 
opportunities.  
We study a large panel of R&D reporting firms across sixteen European economies for the time 
period 1995-2007.  The summary statistics show that R&D investment is large (e.g., comparable to 
physical investment), and stock issues are substantial, particularly for younger firms.  In addition, young 
firms maintain large stocks of cash and equivalents.  R&D intensity and cash holdings are particularly 
high for young firms in the U.K. and Sweden, two countries with highly developed stock markets where 
firms rely heavily on volatile stock issues.   
To explore the impact financial factors have on R&D, we modify a dynamic structural model that 
Bond and Meghir (1994) develop to study fixed investment.  We estimate the R&D model using a 
“systems” GMM estimator that accounts for unobserved firm-specific effects and allows us to address the 
potential endogeneity of all financial variables.  We find little or no evidence that the availability of 
                                                 
3
 This is not to say that prior studies have entirely ignored the importance of external finance for R&D or completely 
overlooked the potential for firms to smooth R&D.  For example, Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) document a 
strong connection between public stock issues and R&D investment during the 1990s U.S. R&D boom, and several 
studies note the potential for adjustment costs to limit the R&D response to transitory finance shocks (e.g., Hall and 
Lerner (2010)).  Brown and Petersen (2011) is the only other study we know of that directly examines the 
connection between cash reserves and R&D investment in U.S. firms.  Their study, however, has nothing to say 
about the implications of R&D smoothing for identifying the impact that internal and external finance has on R&D.  
Nor do they (or any other study) discuss how active cash management can generate additional tests for the existence 
and importance of financing constraints on R&D. 
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internal finance matters for R&D in standard specifications that include only cash flow (i.e., the estimated 
R&D-cash flow sensitivity is near zero), which indicates that a positive link between R&D and cash flow 
is not occurring simply because of poor demand controls.  However, when we include stock issues, and 
particularly when we control for R&D smoothing by including changes in cash holdings, we find a 
positive, statistically significant and quantitatively important link between R&D and both cash flow and 
stock issues.  More importantly for identifying binding financing constraints, the coefficient on the 
change in cash holdings is negative and large (in absolute value), and the coefficient estimates on cash 
flow and stock issues increase sharply when the change in cash holdings is included in the regression.  
Furthermore, cash holdings and access to equity finance have by far the strongest impact on R&D in the 
groups of firms most likely to face binding financing constraints (e.g., younger, smaller, and low dividend 
firms).  In contrast, we find no evidence that access to debt has an important impact on R&D spending.  
We are aware of no single alternative to the financing constraint explanation that can rationalize this full 
set of results.         
Our findings have a number of economic implications.  First, our evidence indicates that 
financing constraints do matter for the R&D investment of publicly traded firms in Europe, contrary to 
much of the existing evidence.  Second, controlling for investment smoothing can be crucial for testing 
for the presence and importance of financing constraints on investments with high adjustment costs.  
Third, our findings suggest that the need to buffer R&D from finance shocks influences corporate 
liquidity management across a wide range of countries, extending the literature on the causes and 
consequences of financial flexibility (e.g., Denis (2011)).  Fourth, our study highlights an important role 
of stock markets for innovation in Europe, suggesting that additional stock market development can 
substantially increase R&D investment, which is an important public policy objective in the EU and many 
other countries.  Finally, our findings highlight a causal channel through which stock market development 
and liberalization can foster innovative activity, thereby leading to economic growth. 
The next section discusses the role of external equity and stocks of liquidity for financing R&D 
and the omitted variable bias from ignoring these sources of funds.  Section III discusses our sample and 
summary statistics and Section IV describes our empirical approach and the main findings.  The final 
sections discuss the implications of our findings and review related literature on finance and innovation. 
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II.  Financial Factors and R&D Investment       
A.  Stock Issues and the R&D-Cash Flow Sensitivity  
Figure 1 presents a supply of finance schedule that depicts the standard financing hierarchy 
described in many places in the literature (e.g., see the review in Hubbard (1998)).
4
  The quantity of 
finance is measured on the horizontal axis, and the marginal cost of funds is measured on the vertical axis.  
The supply of finance schedule is given by S (or S’) and consists of two pieces.   The first piece consists 
of internal finance, or cash flow, with a maximum amount of CF and a constant marginal opportunity cost 
of MCCF.  There is a vertical jump in the supply schedule at CF which is the point at which the firm 
exhausts internal finance and switches to more costly external equity finance.  There are multiple reasons 
why external equity is not a perfect substitute for internal finance, including substantial flotation costs 
(Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996)) and the “lemons premium” due to asymmetric information 
(Myers and Majluf (1984)).  These frictions can create a sizable wedge between the cost of internal and 
external equity finance, and there is evidence that the size of the wedge increases with the size of the 
issue, implying a rising supply curve for external finance (e.g., Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Cornett 
and Tehranian (1994)).   
The demand curve for R&D is depicted by DRD and thus the equilibrium level of R&D is the 
intersection of DRD and S, which occurs at RD.   Since the marginal cost of external finance is increasing, 
it is obvious that this equilibrium depends critically on the quantity of cash flow.  If, for example, the 
level of cash flow increases from CF to CF’, then the supply of finance schedule shifts from S to S’, and 
the new equilibrium shifts from RD to RD’.  Thus, even though the firm in Figure 1 is issuing a 
substantial amount of external equity (difference between RD and CF), the firm is clearly facing a binding 
financing constraint in the sense that more internal finance (or cheaper external finance) would lead to 
more R&D.  We argue below, however, that this simple illustration becomes more complicated once we 
include adjustment costs.    
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
                                                 
4
  We assume the firm has no access to external debt for financing R&D.  Our diagram is thus modified in the sense 
that the upward sloping portion is external equity finance only.  Debt finance is likely the marginal source of finance 
for investments with collateral value, such as fixed investment.   
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There are at least two key reasons to directly consider stock issues when testing for financing 
constraints on R&D.  First, as discussed in the introduction, firms rely heavily on stock issues in the years 
immediately following their IPO (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998)), which is often a period of low (or 
negative) cash flows and high R&D intensity.  This negative correlation between stock issues and cash 
flow should lead to a downward bias in the estimated R&D-cash flow sensitivity in regressions that omit 
stock issues.
5
  Second, including stock issues in the R&D regression (appropriately instrumented) permits 
tests of whether variation in access to external finance matters for R&D (shifts or rotations in the upward 
sloping portion of S in Figure 1), as it should in a world of imperfect access to external finance.
6
  There is 
strong evidence that firms use the proceeds from stock issues to fund R&D (e.g., Kim and Weisbach 
(2008); Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009); Martinsson (2010)), but virtually all studies of R&D and 
financing constraints ignore stock issues.   
B.  R&D Smoothing  
It has long been appreciated that R&D has high adjustment costs (e.g., see the discussions in Hall 
(1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)).  Most R&D investment consists of wage payments to 
highly trained scientists, engineers, and other skilled technology workers who often require a great deal of 
firm-specific training.  Thus, cutting R&D typically entails firing workers.  If the cut in R&D is 
temporary – as in response to a transitory shock to finance – then new workers need to be hired in future 
periods, creating additional hiring and training costs.  In addition, fired R&D workers know critical 
proprietary information that firms do not wish to share with competitors, and the dissemination of such 
information could undermine the value of innovation being undertaken by the firm.  Also of relevance is 
the fact that labor regulations present in many European economies can limit the adjustment of workers to 
temporary shocks.
7
  Finally, studies estimating costs of adjustment for both R&D and physical investment 
                                                 
5
  In our sample, the Pearson correlation coefficient between stock issues and cash flow for new firms is -0.1663 and 
significant at the 1% level. 
6
 In our sample period there is substantial variation in young firm use of external equity, particularly during the late 
1990s and early 2000s, a period when stock prices exploded, and then collapsed, particularly for R&D-intensive 
firms.  In Sweden, for example, the young-firm average stock-to-assets ratio increased by over 200% between 1999 
and 2000, and then declined by 85% between 2000 and 2001.  Similarly, between 1999 and 2000, young-firm stock 
issues increased by 42% in the U.K. and 93% in France, and then fell by 59% and 46%, respectively, the following 
year.   
7
 Messina and Vallanti (2007) show that firing workers in Europe is comparatively unresponsive to economic 
fluctuations since firms try to smooth labor reallocation over the business cycle due to regulations making such 
reallocation costly and time consuming. 
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typically report substantially larger costs for R&D (Bernstein and Nadiri (1989)), an issue we return to in 
Section V when we discuss auxiliary regressions for physical investment (and find little or no use of cash 
holdings to smooth fixed investment).   
High adjustment costs suggest that firms will actively seek to maintain a relatively smooth flow 
of R&D spending.  For firms not facing financing frictions, smoothing R&D should be straightforward, as 
there are multiple forms of finance that can be used to offset shocks to internal finance.  However, for 
R&D-intensive firms facing substantial financing frictions, external finance may be extremely costly or 
unavailable during periods of negative shocks to internal finance.  For these firms, the obvious R&D 
smoothing strategy is to not rely on external markets but to build and manage stocks of internal liquidity, 
which appear on the balance sheet of the firm as “cash and equivalents.”  The stock of liquidity has 
expanded dramatically in the last few decades and is a quantitatively large component of the balance 
sheets of publicly traded firms in Europe (see Table 1), giving them substantial capacity to buffer R&D 
from negative finance shocks.
8
   
Active R&D smoothing complicates testing for the impact that financing constraints have on 
R&D.  This can readily be seen by referring back to Figure 1.  Suppose a firm receives a positive cash 
flow shock that increases cash flow from CF to CF’.  If the firm believes this is a temporary shock, it 
presumably will not increase R&D all the way to RD’.  Rather, the firm will increase R&D by some 
fraction of the cash flow shock, banking the remainder in anticipation of leaner times.  A similar story 
holds when there are positive shocks to the cost of external finance (driving down S in Figure 1): the firm 
is likely to bank much of the extra stock issue, dampening the increase in R&D.  Likewise, if a firm 
receives a negative shock to finance, it is likely to draw down cash holdings to dampen much of the shock 
to finance.  The firm, of course, still faces binding financing constraints, and in the long-run, R&D 
remains just as constrained by the level of cash flow (and access to external finance) as if the firm did not 
engage in smoothing.  But within-firm regressions that ignore endogenous liquidity management will 
almost surely result in a downward biased estimate of financing constraints as much of the year-to-year 
                                                 
8
 We note, however, that there are substantial costs to building and maintaining large cash holdings, including 
agency costs and the fact that interest earned on cash holdings is often taxed at a higher rate than interest earned by 
individuals (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and Faulkender and Wang (2006)).  Thus, while 
we expect financially constrained firms to maintain larger stocks of liquidity, there are limits to the extent that 
constrained firms can buffer R&D from shocks to finance.  
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variation in R&D is being buffered by active smoothing with cash holdings.  This smoothing behavior can 
potentially explain why some studies find much stronger evidence of binding financing constraints on 
fixed capital spending than on R&D.   
In our tests for the presence of financing constraints, we control for this liquidity management by 
including the change in cash holdings (or ΔCashHoldings) in our regressions.  Brown and Petersen (2011) 
use a similar approach to show that young U.S. firms use cash reserves to smooth R&D during the 
volatile 1998-2002 period.  We note, however, that their paper is narrowly focused on how firms manage 
to smooth R&D, not on what this smoothing activity means for identifying financing constraints.  That is, 
they do not discuss or explore how R&D smoothing can cause misleading inference about the importance 
of financing constraints for R&D.  Nor do they show how active cash management can be used to provide 
additional tests and evidence of financing constraints.  We are aware of no other studies of R&D 
financing constraints that directly account for firm smoothing efforts. 
C.  Testing for Financing Constraints on R&D 
The standard approach for testing for financing constraints has been to examine the cash flow 
sensitivity of investment (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988)).  A potential weakness of this 
approach is that the controls for investment demand are likely imperfect; as a consequence, because 
changes in financial variables correlate positively with changes in profits, cash flow may simply be 
capturing new information about the profitability of investment.   Some recent studies (e.g., Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) and Moyen (2004)) raise other questions about the use of conventional investment-cash 
flow regressions to draw inference about the importance of financing constraints, particularly in studies 
that do not address the endogeneity of cash flow or fail to control for the potential use of external 
finance.
9
     
                                                 
9
 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that it is theoretically possible for more constrained firms (i.e., firms facing a 
steeper external finance schedule) to display a lower investment-cash flow sensitivity than relatively less constrained 
firms.  Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (2003, p. 154) note that it “remains the case in [the Kaplan-Zingales] 
model that a firm facing no financial constraint … would display no excess sensitivity to cash flow,” in which case 
the Kaplan-Zingales criticism does not apply.  Moyen (2004) calibrates a model where firms use debt as a substitute 
for internal finance and uses an OLS regression on simulated data to show that positive cash flow sensitivities can be 
generated even if firms do not face financing frictions.  The unconstrained firms in Moyen’s (2004) study display 
cash flow sensitivities because current period debt finance is correlated with contemporaneous cash flow and debt 
finance is not included in the regression.  We directly control for the use of external finance in the R&D regressions, 
and we instrument cash flow to eliminate the contemporaneous correlation between external finance and the cash 
flow regression variable. 
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We emphasize that our approach for evaluating the importance of financing constraints on R&D 
is not based on standard estimates of the investment-cash flow sensitivity (indeed, we find no evidence of 
an important R&D-finance link if we estimate only conventional R&D-cash flow regressions).  Rather, by 
examining several different predictions that follow from active R&D smoothing with cash holdings, our 
approach avoids these critiques and provides new tests for the presence of financing constraints on R&D.  
First, ΔCashHoldings should have a negative association with R&D in within-firm regressions with 
controls for other sources of finance, as reductions in cash holdings free liquidity for R&D smoothing.  
We emphasize that ΔCashHoldings is positively correlated with firm investment spending, the other 
financial variables, and standard measures of investment opportunities.  Therefore, problems measuring 
investment demand should bias upwards the estimated coefficients on ΔCashHoldings in the R&D 
regressions (i.e., lead to positive coefficients), so a negative coefficient on ΔCashHoldings is not an 
artifact of inadequate demand control.
10
  Second, if firms actively manage their cash reserves to buffer 
R&D from transitory finance shocks, then controlling for the smoothing role of cash holdings should 
increase the estimated impact that other financial factors have on R&D, revealing the longer-run impact 
that access to finance has on R&D.  Finally, the above connections between R&D and cash holdings 
should arise primarily for firms which are a priori most likely to face binding financing constraints.  It is 
difficult to provide a single alternative explanation (other than financing constraints) that can readily 
rationalize this set of predictions. 
 III. Sample and Summary Statistics 
A.   Sample 
 We build the regression sample from all European firms with coverage in the Compustat 
Global database over the period 1995-2007.  All major economies in Europe are in the sample and a list 
of the 16 countries (and number of firms) appears in Table 1A in the Appendix.  We necessarily focus 
only on firms that report positive R&D spending, and we exclude any firm that does not have at least one 
string of three consecutive R&D-to-assets observations during the sample period (firms without three 
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  Fazzari and Petersen (1993) make a related argument, but not in the context of R&D smoothing or the use of cash 
holdings.  Across all firm-years of data for the young firms in our sample, the Pearson correlation coefficient with 
ΔCashHoldings is 0.342 for R&D, 0.117 for capital spending, 0.745 for stock issues, 0.058 for cash flow, 0.229 for 
sales growth, and 0.210 for the market-to-book ratio. 
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consecutive R&D observations would contribute no observations to the regressions).  To be consistent 
with the related literature, we focus only on firms with a primary SIC code in a manufacturing industry 
(SIC 2000-3999), the sector of the economy that accounts for the majority of R&D.  Before estimating the 
regressions we trim the 1% tails of all regression variables (the results are similar if we Winsorize instead 
of trim).   
B.  Summary Statistics    
 Table 1 reports summary statistics for the sample used in the regressions.  We first report 
statistics for “all of Europe” and we then provide separate statistics for the U.K., Sweden, Germany, 
France and “all other Europe”, which includes the remaining 12 countries.  There are two main reasons 
for reporting separate results for the U.K., Sweden, Germany, and France.  First, these countries have the 
largest number of firms in the sample, with the U.K. accounting for 25.7% of the sample, followed by 
Germany (15.5%), France (9.6%) and Sweden (9.4%).  Second, the U.K. and Sweden are leading 
examples of “market based” economies with strong public equity markets, while Germany and France are 
“bank based” economies.  Focusing on these countries thus allows us to compare how financial factors 
impact R&D across countries with different financial systems.  For each group we sort firms into “young” 
and “mature” based on the year the firm first appears in Compustat Global with non-missing sales.  Firms 
who first appear after 1995 are typically recently listed firms and we classify them as “young.” 11  In the 
regression section we use firm age (along with firm size and dividend payment) to sort firms into 
constrained and unconstrained groups, following the approach in a number of recent studies (e.g., Fee, 
Hadlock and Pierce (2009) and Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009)).  With the exception of number of 
employees, all variables are scaled by beginning of year total assets.   
 The first column of Table 1 reports information for the full sample of 16 countries.  Four numbers 
are particularly important.  First, the R&D ratio is substantial:  the mean is 0.085, which is larger than the 
mean physical investment ratio (0.058).  Second, the mean (net) stock issue-to-assets ratio (0.108) is only 
slightly smaller than the mean cash flow ratio (0.125), showing the importance of stock issues as a source 
of funds.  (The median value of stock issues is zero, as expected, as Table 1 reports values for pooled 
                                                 
11
 In order to evaluate appropriateness of this sample split we have checked the actual year of the IPO for the 
Swedish sample. The average year of the IPO in the “young” sample is 1999 while in the “old” sample the average 
year of IPO is 1966.  
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firm-year observations and stock issues tend to be large in some years and zero in others.)  Third, the 
mean of new long-term debt issues (0.015) is quite small, which is the main reason we ignore debt in the 
primary regression specification.  (We include debt in the regressions in Table 5 and find no effect).  
Fourth, the average cash holdings ratio (0.223) is well above the mean of either cash flow or stock issues, 
showing that firms do in fact have substantial stocks of liquidity that can potentially be used to buffer 
R&D from transitory shocks to finance.  
 Columns two and three report information for the full sample split into “young” and “mature” 
firms.  As expected, older firms are much larger than young firms.  There are three other noteworthy 
differences between young and mature firms.  First, younger firms are more R&D-intensive than older 
firms, which is expected for a number of reasons, including relatively greater growth opportunities for 
young firms.  Second, stock issues are far more important for young firms: the mean of the stock issue 
ratio is 0.181 for young firms but only 0.025 for mature firms.  The lack of stock issues for mature firms 
is consistent with previous findings in the literature that stock issues are used primarily in the early stage 
of the firm’s life cycle.  Third, young firms have average cash holdings ratios that are over twice as large 
as the cash holdings for mature firms (0.296 compared to 0.139), showing that buffer stocks of liquidity 
are more important for firms likely to face financing constraints. 
 The remaining columns in Table 1 report separate statistics for the U.K, Sweden, Germany, 
France and all other Europe.  There are some noteworthy similarities and differences across countries.  
First, young German and French firms (particularly the latter), are much larger than young U.K. and 
Swedish firms, a point we will return to when we interpret the somewhat weaker link between financial 
factors and R&D for German and French firms.  Second, young U.K. firms are considerably more R&D 
intensive, rely more on stock issues, and have higher cash holdings ratios than their counterparts in 
Germany, France and the rest of Europe.  Swedish firms fall somewhere between firms from the U.K and 
those from Germany, France, and the rest of Europe.  The greater reliance on stock issues for U.K. and 
Swedish firms is consistent with both countries having a more “market based” financial system.  It is 
important to point out, however, that stock issues are also quantitatively important for some young firms 
in Germany, France and the rest of Europe, as indicated by the substantial average stock ratios.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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IV.    R&D Regressions 
A.  Specification and Empirical Approach 
We follow Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) and explore the importance of financial factors 
for R&D by modifying an investment model that Bond and Meghir (1994) develop to study fixed 
investment.  The Bond and Meghir (1994) approach (also used in Bond et al. (2003)) is based on the 
dynamic optimization “Euler condition” for imperfectly competitive firms that accumulate productive 
assets with a quadratic adjustment cost technology.  As Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (2003, p. 
153) discuss, a significant advantage of this approach is that “under the maintained structure, the model 
captures the influence of current expectations of future profitability on current investment decisions; and 
it can therefore be argued that current or lagged financial variables should not enter this specification 
merely as proxies for expected future profitability.”  Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen (2003) note that 
another advantage is that the resulting empirical specification corresponds to an intuitive, dynamic R&D 
regression, and thus the parameter estimates have a readily understandable interpretation even if some of 
the assumptions required of the underlying structural model do not strictly hold in the data.       
Similar to Bond and Meghir (1994), we augment the baseline Euler specification derived under 
the assumption of no financing frictions with variables that measure the firm’s access to both internal and 
external equity finance.  We also add the change in cash holdings to the specification to control for the 
use of cash for R&D smoothing.  In addition, we add Tobin’s Q as an additional control for investment 
demand.   The resulting empirical specification is: 
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              (1) 
RDj,t is R&D spending for firm j in period t.  The expected coefficient (in the Euler condition) on lagged 
R&D is positive and the expected coefficient on the quadratic term is negative; in the model with no 
financing frictions both coefficients will slightly exceed one in absolute value.  In Bond and Meghir 
(1994), lagged sales enters the Euler condition if there is imperfect competition.  The financial variables 
include contemporaneous and lagged cash flow (CashFlow), funds from stock issues net of repurchases 
(StkIssues), and changes in cash holdings (ΔCashHoldings).  All regression variables are scaled by the 
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beginning-of-period stock of firm assets.  The model includes a firm-specific effect (αj) to control for all 
unobserved time-invariant determinants of R&D at the firm level, such as the technology of the firm, 
industry characteristics, and country-specific regulatory or institutional characteristics that are constant 
over the sample period.  The model also includes a time-specific effect (dt) to control for aggregate 
changes that could affect the demand for R&D, such as the state of the macro economy.  We discuss 
alternative specifications, including specifications that include new debt issues, in Section V.     
We estimate equation (1) with the “system” GMM estimator developed for dynamic panel models 
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  This approach allows us to address the 
potential endogeneity of all financial variables, including stock issues and ΔCashHoldings, by jointly 
estimating a regression of equation (1) in differences and in levels, using lagged levels as instruments for 
the regression in differences and lagged differences as instruments for the regression in levels.
12
  In 
addition, Almeida, Campello, and Galvao (2010) have recently shown that an OLS-IV approach similar in 
spirit to the GMM estimator we use is a tractable and relatively robust way to deal with measurement 
error in standard empirical investment equations.   
  Our primary results use one-step GMM and rely on lagged levels dated t-3 and t-4 as instruments 
for the regression in differences and lagged differences dated t-2 for the regression in levels.  The 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation.  As we discuss in 
Section V, the estimates are similar if we use two-step GMM or employ alternative instrument sets.  To 
assess instrument validity we report a Hansen J-test of the null that the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid, a difference-in-Hansen test that evaluates the validity of the additional instruments required for 
systems estimation (i.e., the validity of the instruments used in the levels equation), and an m2 test for 
second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals.  These tests generally indicate no major 
problems with our primary instrument set, particularly in the most important specifications. 
 
                                                 
12
 Estimating the regression in both differences and levels addresses the weak instrument problem that arises from 
using lagged levels of persistent explanatory variables as instruments for the regression in differences (Blundell and 
Bond (1998)).  Including the levels equation does, however, require that an additional moment restriction hold in the 
data: differences in the right-hand side variables in equation (1) cannot be correlated with the firm-specific effect.  
Furthermore, identification in this setting rests on the assumption that past changes in the endogenous financial 
variables (e.g., ΔCashHoldings) are correlated with current period R&D only through their correlation with current 
period financial variables.             
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B. Impact of Adding Stock Issues and Controlling for Smoothing   
  Table 2 reports GMM estimates of equation (1) for six samples:  i) all Europe, ii) U.K., iii) 
Sweden, iv) Germany, v) France and vi) all other Europe.  For each sample, we report three regressions.  
We begin with a dynamic R&D regression model containing only cash flow, the standard financial 
variable examined in the literature.  We then add stock issues to the specification and, finally, we include 
ΔCashHoldings.  Before discussing the main findings, we note that in all regressions, the coefficient for 
lagged R&D is close to one (reflecting the persistence in R&D) and the coefficient on lagged R&D-
squared is negative and statistically significant, but somewhat smaller in absolute value than predicted by 
the Euler condition (under the assumption of quadratic adjustment costs).  In addition, the estimated 
coefficient for Tobin’s Q is positive in all regressions and often statistically significant. 
 For the “all Europe” sample, the sum of the cash flow coefficients in the initial specification 
(column (1)) is near zero (0.010).  Adding stock issues in the second regression results in a rise in the sum 
of the estimated cash flow coefficients (to 0.046), but a chi-squared test continues to reject the null that 
the sum is statistically different from zero (p-value of 0.519). The estimated coefficients for stock issues 
have opposite signs and are nearly offsetting. Of particular importance, adding ΔCashHoldings in the 
third regression results in a very sharp rise in the coefficients on both cash flow and stock issues: the sum 
of the cash flow coefficients increases to 0.176 and the sum of the stock coefficients increases to 0.131.  
Furthermore, both sums are now highly statistically significant (p-values of 0.003 or smaller).  In 
addition, the sum of the current and lagged coefficients on ΔCashHoldings is negative, large in absolute 
value (-0.142) and statistically significant.  The point estimates on ΔCashHoldings and the impact that 
including this variable has on the other financial coefficients indicate that firms rely heavily on cash 
holdings to smooth R&D.  Overall, the results are consistent with important omitted variable biases from 
excluding stock issues and not controlling for R&D smoothing.   
 Columns (4)-(6) report the results for the U.K.  The sum of the cash flow coefficients is positive 
but insignificant (0.081) in the initial specification (column (4)) and the sum of the stock coefficients is 
negative and insignificant in column (5).  In column six, controlling for changes in cash holdings causes 
the estimated coefficients on both cash flow and stock issues to rise sharply (the sum of the cash flow 
coefficients is now 0.201 (p-value = 0.002) and the sum of the stock coefficients is now 0.114 (p-value = 
15 
 
0.011)), and the sum of the coefficients on ΔCashHoldings is negative, large in absolute value (-0.155) 
and highly significant.  For Sweden (columns (7)-(9)), the pattern of results is broadly similar to the 
pattern for the U.K.  That is, the financial coefficients are all small in regressions that exclude 
ΔCashHoldings (columns (7) and (8)), but increase sharply and are statistically and economically 
significant once ΔCashHoldings is included in the regression.  Likewise, the sum of the coefficients on 
ΔCashHoldings is negative, quantitatively important (-0.213) and highly significant.      
  The pattern for Germany and France is generally similar to that of the U.K. and Sweden, except 
the statistical significance in the French sample is substantially weaker.  For both Germany and France 
there is little or no evidence of financing constraints in the regressions that exclude ΔCashHoldings 
(columns (10) and (11) and columns (13) and (14)).  When ΔCashHoldings is included in the regression 
(columns (12) and (15)) there is a large jump in the estimated sum of stock issue coefficients in both 
countries, and there is also a substantial jump in the sum of the cash flow coefficients for France (from -
0.032 to 0.042).  In addition, in both France and Germany the sum of the coefficients on ΔCashHoldings 
is negative and substantial (in absolute value), although not significant at conventional levels for France.  
For both Germany and France the sum of the cash flow coefficients are positive, but the values are 
modest and the sum of the coefficients is statistically insignificant in the French sample.     
In the rest of Europe (remaining 12 countries) there is evidence of a cash flow effect even without 
controlling for smoothing.  When ΔCashHoldings in included in the final regression, there is a modest 
jump in the sum of cash flow coefficients and a doubling of the sum of coefficients for stock issues.  In 
this final regression, the sum of the cash flow coefficients is 0.166, the sum of the stock coefficients is 
0.151, and sum of the ΔCashHoldings coefficients is -0.112 and all sums are statistically significant with 
exception of ΔCashHoldings (which just misses statistical significance at the ten percent level).   
The six sets of regressions show a consistent pattern.  For all Europe and the individual countries, 
we find evidence of a strong link between financial factors and R&D, but only when we directly control 
for endogenous R&D smoothing by including ΔCashHoldings in the regression.  In general, the estimated 
impact that cash flow and stock issues have on R&D increases sharply after we control for changes in 
cash holdings.  In all sets of regressions the coefficients on ΔCashHoldings are negative and substantial 
(in absolute value), further indicating that firms use buffer stocks of liquidity to smooth R&D.   
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
C. Sample Splits: All Europe   
 We expect a stronger link between the financial variables and R&D in the groups of firms most 
likely to be financially constrained.  We also expect the predicted signs and magnitude of the lagged R&D 
terms from the structural model derived under the assumption of no financing constraints to hold best in 
the groups of firms least likely to face binding constraints.  We follow the literature and use age, firm 
size, and dividend payouts to sort firms into constrained and unconstrained groups.
13
  Firm age is likely 
strongly correlated with asymmetric information problems and has the advantage of being potentially less 
endogenous than other splitting criteria.  Young firms also rely heavily on external equity finance (see 
Table 1), suggesting that they are operating along a rising portion of the supply of finance schedule (if 
capital markets are imperfect).  Size of firms is another commonly used split and small firms in our 
sample often rely heavily on external equity finance (but large firms typically do not).  We consider firms 
to be “large” if their average level of employment over the sample period is above the 70th percentile, and 
“small” otherwise.  Finally, following the logic in Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) that low 
dividend firms are more likely to face binding financing constraints, we split firms into low and high 
dividend groups.  We put firms into the high dividend group if their average dividend-to-assets ratio over 
the sample period is above the 70
th
 percentile; otherwise they are put in the low payout group.  For ease of 
discussion, we refer to the new, small, and low dividend groups of firms as “plausibly constrained,” and 
the old, large, and high dividend groups as “plausibly unconstrained”.  
To economize on space (and to make comparisons less tedious), we report the sums of the 
financial coefficients in Table 3.  For the plausibly constrained groups, the coefficients on lagged R&D 
and lagged R&D-squared are smaller (in absolute value) than predicted by the Euler condition, as 
expected given the condition is derived under the null of no financing constraints.  More importantly, the 
sums of the coefficients on the financial factors are always large (in absolute value) and statistically 
significant.  For example for the plausibly constrained group, the sum of cash flow coefficients ranges 
from 0.170 for low dividend firms to 0.202 for young firms.   
                                                 
13  Hadlock and Pierce (2010) use qualitative information disclosed by firms to create an index of financing 
constraints for a large random sample of firms and conclude that firm age and size are the two variables most related 
to the qualitative information reported by firms concerning the presence of financing constraints.  
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 For the plausibly unconstrained groups, the coefficients on lagged R&D and lagged R&D-
squared are consistent with the predictions from the structural model derived under the assumption of no 
financing constraints (see the discussion of equation (1)) for all splits except high dividend firms.  In 
addition, sums of the coefficients for the financial factors are quantitatively small and generally 
statistically insignificant, and are always far smaller than the sums of the coefficients for the plausibly 
constrained groups.  In particular, for both large firms and high dividend firms, none of the financial 
factors are statistically significant; for the mature firms the only significant financial factor is 
ΔCashHoldings.  These small and insignificant coefficients are important, as Bond, Elston, Mairesse and 
Mulkay (2003) argue that heterogeneity tests are most convincing when the plausibly unconstrained 
group displays no evidence of financing constraints.
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
D.   Sample Splits for Individual Countries 
 Table 4 reports regression results for our three different sample splits for individual countries.    
Once again, we sum the financial coefficients and we report the corresponding chi-squared tests below the 
sum.  We also leave out the lagged R&D terms, Q and lagged sales to conserve space.  Test statistics are 
reported at the bottom of each panel.
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Panel A reports the results when our sample is split into young and mature firms.  For young 
firms, financial coefficients are generally quantitatively large (in absolute value) and statistically 
significant in the U.K., Sweden, Germany and all other Europe.  The sum of the cash flow coefficients is 
particularly large in the U.K. (0.244).  France is the one country with no evidence of a link between 
financial factors and R&D.  For mature firms, the coefficients on all of the financial variables are 
quantitatively small and insignificant for the U.K, Sweden and France.  In Germany, mature firms have 
                                                 
14
 We also repeat (but do not report) the exercise in Table 3, where the regressions progress from one financial factor 
(cash flow) to all three financial factors.  For the plausibly constrained group, we get exactly the same pattern of 
results as reported in Table 2: adding stock issues impacts the cash flow coefficients, but the largest impact arises 
from adding ΔCashHoldings to the regressions.  For the plausibly unconstrained groups, adding stock issues makes 
little difference and the impact of adding ΔCashHoldings is quantitatively small. 
15
 In several of the country level splits we have a small number of firms relative to the number of instruments 
generated by our estimation approach.  The instrument validity tests are less reliable in this setting, as evidenced by 
the implausibly high p-values generated by the J-test.   See Bowsher (2002). 
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significant sums for cash flow and ΔCashHoldings; in all other Europe, the sum of the cash flow 
coefficients is significant, but much smaller than the cash flow sum for young firms. 
Panel B reports regressions split by firm size.  Once again, for the small firms (plausibly 
constrained group), all of the financial coefficients are quantitatively large (in absolute value) and 
statistically significant in the U.K., Sweden, Germany and “all other Europe”.  As in Panel A, financial 
effects are not evident in France.  For large firms, with the exception of cash flow for Germany and ‘all 
other Europe’, there are no positive and statistically significant sums for either cash flow or stock issues.   
Finally, Panel C reports findings when the sample is split by dividends.  For the low dividend 
firms (plausibly constrained group), the pattern of financial coefficients (size and significance) is similar 
to the results in Panels A and B.  There is somewhat stronger evidence of financial effects in France 
(compared to Panels A and B), but the sums are statistically insignificant for all three financial variables.   
For high dividend firms, cash flow is significantly positive only in the ‘all other Europe’ sample, but this 
sum is substantially smaller than the sum for low dividends firms.  Stock issues are significant for mature 
firms in Germany and France, but we note that the sample of high dividend firms in both of these 
countries is very small.    
Thus, for the U.K., Sweden and “all other Europe”, the findings in Table 4 line up very closely 
with the full sample findings in Table 3.  That is, there are quantitatively large and typically significant 
sums of coefficients on all financial variables in the plausibly constrained groupings, and small and 
generally insignificant coefficients for the plausibly unconstrained groupings.  This is reassuring, as the 
U.K., Sweden and “all other Europe” constitute approximately 75% of the total sample.  For Germany, 
for plausibly constrained firms, there are quantitatively substantial and statistically significant coefficients 
on all financial variables; for plausibly unconstrained firms, there are some instances of significant 
financial effects.  For France, there is evidence of financial effects only for low dividend firms.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
V.    Robustness     
A.  Additional Results for R&D  
 The findings we present above are robust to a number of alternative specifications and estimation 
approaches.  We present three of the most important checks in Table 5.  While we report results using the 
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age split only, we obtain a similar pattern of results when we use either dividends or size to classify firms 
as plausibly constrained or unconstrained.  First, in columns (1) and (2), we adjust the instrument set to 
include lagged levels dated t-2 to t-4 and lagged differences dated t-1.  For young firms, we recover 
financial effects that are very similar to the findings in the corresponding regression in Table 3. For 
mature firms, the estimates on the lagged R&D terms are consistent with the predictions of the structural 
model and the financial effects are small and insignificant, consistent with the findings in Table 3.  
Second, in columns (3) and (4), we include sales growth as an alternative to Q for controlling for firm’s 
investment opportunities.   For young firms, the estimates for the key financial variables are similar to 
their counterparts in Table 3.  In contrast, the estimated financial effects for mature firms are much 
smaller and only ΔCashHoldings is statistically significant.   
 Third, in columns (5) and (6), we include current and lagged values of new long-term debt issues 
in equation (1) and recover similar coefficient estimates on the key financial variables.  In addition, unlike 
cash flow and stock issues, the estimated coefficient on new debt issues is negative but insignificant for 
constrained firms and approximately zero for unconstrained firms.  These results are consistent with 
arguments that debt is poorly suited for funding R&D and further highlight the particular importance of 
stock market development and the availability of equity finance for funding innovative activity.
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[Insert Table  here] 
B.   Fixed Investment  
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) provide a careful study of the nature of adjustment costs for 
physical investment and find that costs of adjustment for physical investment are “relatively modest.”  As 
a result, firms should rely much less on cash reserves for buffering fixed investment than they do for 
R&D.  Indeed, when we substitute fixed capital investment for R&D in the main regressions the sum of 
the coefficients for ΔCashHoldings are always near zero and typically insignificant at conventional levels.  
For example, for the regression that corresponds to the third specification in Table 2 (all countries, all 
firms), the sum of the coefficients for ΔCashHoldings is 0.002 and statistically insignificant.  We find 
exactly the same pattern when we split the sample by age, size and dividend payout.  In these regressions, 
                                                 
16
 We explore a number of other robustness checks that are available on request.    We note that our findings are also 
similar if we use alternative data transformations (forward orthogonal deviations instead of first differences) or rely 
on two-step GMM with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. 
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for constrained firms, the largest absolute value for the sum of ΔCashHoldings is -0.010 (for low dividend 
firms) and the estimate is statistically insignificant.  In addition, running the fixed investment regressions 
without ΔCashHoldings has little or no impact on the estimated coefficients for the other financial 
variables (e.g., cash flow).  Thus, when testing for financing constraints, controlling for smoothing 
appears to be much less important for fixed investment compared to R&D.  These findings provide 
additional confidence in the results for R&D, since cash reserves should be much less important for 
investments that have modest adjustment costs, which is an extension of the basic predictions discussed in 
Section II.   
VI. Discussion and Implications    
A.   Testing for Financing Constraints on R&D      
Our paper provides new insights into testing for whether financing constraints matter for R&D.  
First, ignoring stock issues and R&D smoothing with cash holdings can result in sharp downward biases 
in the estimated link between R&D and cash flow, potentially leading to an incorrect assessment of the 
importance of financing constraints in studies that look only at the standard R&D-cash flow sensitivity.  
(We show, in fact, that firms a priori most likely to face substantial financing frictions can exhibit 
essentially no R&D-cash flow relation if stock issues and R&D smoothing are ignored.)  Second, as 
discussed in the introduction, our full set of findings – particularly the negative link between changes in 
cash holdings and R&D and the sharp increase in the estimated link between R&D and the equity finance 
variables when we control for R&D smoothing with cash holdings – offer new tests for the presence of 
quantitatively important financing constraints on R&D that are difficult to rationalize with alternative 
explanations.   
B.  Financing Constraints across Countries 
Several studies rely on a comparison of investment-finance sensitivities across countries to draw 
inference about the relative importance of binding financing frictions (e.g., Bond, Elston, Mairesse and 
Mulkay (2003)).  One possible interpretation of our findings is that R&D financing constraints are more 
severe in the market-based economies of the U.K. and Sweden than the bank-based systems in Germany 
and France.  We think this need not be the case.  Rather, we believe these findings reflect the fact that 
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market-based financial systems tend to have better-developed stock markets, and better stock markets 
generate more young publicly traded firms at a stage in their life cycle when internal finance is low and 
costly external finance is used extensively to fund R&D investment.  The summary statistics in Table 1 
show that “young” U.K. and Swedish firms are much smaller and have lower cash flow ratios than 
“young” German or French firms, almost surely because “young” firms in the U.K and Sweden went 
public at an earlier stage of development.
17
  The link between finance and investment may be strongest in 
countries with well-developed stock markets precisely because strong stock markets support a larger 
number of firms that are highly dependent on costly external finance and thus have investment that is 
especially sensitive to internal and external finance shocks.  Thus, our approach is useful for identifying 
the presence of financing constraints within a country (or group of countries), but it may not identify the 
relative importance of financing constraints across countries.   
Hall and Lerner (2010, p. 23) note that an alternative explanation for stronger financial effects in 
market-based financial systems is that “firms are more sensitive to demand signals in thick financial 
equity markets.”  For several reasons, we believe that a “financing constraint” explanation is more 
consistent with our set of findings than a “demand-side” explanation.  First, when we follow the standard 
practice of regressing R&D on cash flow (with no other financial variables) we obtain quantitatively 
small and insignificant cash flow coefficients in the U.K. and Sweden, countries with thick financial 
equity markets, which is inconsistent with a “demand-side” explanation.  Second, when we include 
ΔCashHoldings to control for R&D smoothing, financial effects are present in the U.K. and Sweden only 
for the plausibly constrained firms (see Table 4).  If demand signals drive R&D-finance sensitivities, then 
R&D and finance correlations should be present for all firm types, regardless of the likelihood they face 
binding financing constraints.  Third, as we discuss above, ΔCashHoldings is positively correlated with 
the other financial variables, and hence with demand shocks, so if demand shocks cause positive 
coefficients on other financial variables, they should lead to a positive coefficient on ΔCashHoldings, the 
opposite of our findings.   
C.  Finance and Innovation  
                                                 
17
 Vandemaele (2003) reports a median age of 28 years for French firms going public, while Ljungqvist (1997) 
reports a median age of 52 for German IPOs in the period 1970-1990, compared to 7 years for the U.S.    
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 While the focus of our study is to explore whether financing constraints matter for R&D, our 
findings also provide new evidence that access to external equity finance matters for R&D.   In particular, 
in our GMM-IV regressions, the estimated coefficients for stock issues are statistically significant and of 
a magnitude similar to the coefficient for internal finance for firms who plausibly face binding 
constraints.  Given the magnitude of the coefficient on stock issues, our findings suggest that access to 
stock issues plays an important role in funding R&D for firms whose investment demand outstrips the 
flow of internal finance. 
It is interesting to compare our study with a complementary paper by Hsu, Tian and Xu (2012), 
which examines the connection between financial development and innovation in a sample of 34 
countries (including the countries used in our study).  They show that the development of equity markets 
(as measured by market capitalization) encourages innovation productivity (as measured by patenting), 
which is consistent with our evidence on the linkage between stock issues and R&D.  They also report 
evidence that the development of credit markets actually impedes innovation productivity, suggesting that 
credit market development is a bad substitute for equity market development when it comes to 
encouraging innovation.   While we do not focus on credit market development in our study, when we 
include current and lagged values of new long-term debt issues in equation (1) we recover negative (but 
insignificant) coefficients on debt issues (for plausibly constrained firms).  This finding is generally 
supportive of the negative linkage between credit and innovation emphasized in Hsu, Tian and Xu (2012). 
 More generally, our study is related to a rapidly growing literature on finance and innovation.  
Much of this literature focuses on patenting, which is an output of R&D.
18
  One portion of the broad 
literature focuses on the connection between legal institutions and finance and innovation.  Given the 
importance of equity markets for R&D, countries with better investor protection for shareholders should 
arguably have better developed stock markets and greater R&D intensity, a proposition supported by 
evidence in Brown, Martinsson and Petersen (2012).  Their findings suggest that strengthening 
shareholder protection can lead to higher levels of innovation.  Laws permitting antitakeover provisions 
                                                 
18
  To our knowledge, firm level data on patenting is not readily available for a broad international sample like we 
study.  It would be interesting to check our results using R&D with information on firms’ patenting and therefore be 
able to extend the analysis to innovation output. Attempting to merge information on patents to the Compustat 
Global database is a complex process demanding considerable resources (see Thoma et al. (2010) for a description 
of the process of merging firm-level data and patent statistics).  
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may also promote innovation in an environment where outside shareholders undervalue R&D and other 
innovative investments because of the information asymmetries that are naturally associated with 
innovation.  In this environment, antitakeover mechanisms can insulate managers from short-term 
pressures from outside investors, creating greater incentives for long-term investments in innovation, a 
view strongly supported by findings in Chemmanur and Tian (2012).  Given the riskiness of innovation, 
the nature of the bankruptcy codes is likely to impact the incentives to innovate, given that the bankruptcy 
code impacts the transfer of control rights if a firm enters a period of financial distress.  Acharya and 
Subramanian (2009) provide evidence that a debtor-friendly bankruptcy code increases the overall rate of 
innovation in the economy, suggesting that strengthening creditor protection is not the right policy for 
promoting innovation.   
 Besides legal institutions, there are several other recent studies on connections between finance 
and innovation, including papers that deal with the importance of “failure tolerance.” Manso (2011) 
argues that incentive schemes designed to encourage managers to innovate should be forgiving (or even 
rewarding) of early stage failure.  Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2009) argue that the long-term 
focus of institutional ownership (of public companies) stimulates innovation because institutions are less 
likely to fire managers for not meeting short-term earnings targets.  Tian and Wang (2011) show that IPO 
firms financed by more failure-tolerant venture capital investors produce a larger number of patents, 
particularly in industries where the failure risk is very high.  Finally a number of other studies provide 
evidence of economic factors that appear to impede innovation, including conglomeration (Seru (2011)), 
enhanced stock market liquidity (Fang, Tian and Tice (2011)) and greater analyst coverage (He and Tian 
(2012)).  
D.  Public Policy and R&D Intensity  
R&D intensity has long been lower in the EU than in the U.S., and the main reason is lower 
business R&D intensity in the EU.
19
  The lower levels of R&D in Europe were a key subject of the Lisbon 
European Council (2000) and the Barcelona European Council (2002), which recommended an R&D goal 
for the EU of 3% of GDP by 2010 (compared to 1.85% for the EU-27 in 2007).  Our findings suggest that 
                                                 
19
 For example, over the period 2000-2005, R&D spending by businesses averaged 1.2% of GDP in the EU-15 
compared to 1.9% in the U.S. (Uppenberg (2009)).   Furthermore, Uppenberg shows that the lower level of business 
R&D investment in Europe is due to lower R&D intensity at the sectoral level, and is not due to different sectoral 
specialization. 
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policies increasing access to external equity finance can increase R&D investment in firms with 
insufficient internal resources to fully fund investment demand.  Straightforward policy initiatives include 
efforts to improve accounting standards and craft regulations that permit firms to list on equity markets at 
an earlier age (perhaps even before they are profitable).  For example, beginning in the 1980s, Sweden 
removed many restrictions in their financial markets, which led to a 20-fold increase in the transaction 
volume on their stock exchange between 1980-1990 (Englund (1990)).
20
  Other policy initiatives involve 
strengthening investor protection, which appears to be strongly associated with improved access to equity 
finance (e.g., La Porta et al. (1997, Tables IV and VI)).  Finally, improvements in the microstructure of 
European equity markets can increase access to public equity finance (see Pagano (1998) for an overview 
of the dramatic changes in the structure of European equity markets).  
There are currently large differences in stock market development within Europe, suggesting 
considerable scope for improving access to public equity in Europe.  To illustrate, consider some facts 
highlighting the differences between the market-based economies of the U.K and Sweden and the bank-
based economies of France and Germany.  First, based on the number of IPOs reported in Loughran, 
Ritter and Rydqvist (1994, updated in 2009), the U.K. and Sweden had three to four times as many IPOs 
as Germany and France in recent decades, after adjusting for the size of the economy.  Second, the total 
number of publicly listed firms is three to four times larger in the U.K. and Sweden compared to Germany 
and France (after adjusting for size of the economy).  Third, the ratio of stock market value traded to GDP 
is much greater in the U.K. and Sweden than in Germany and France.
21
  Fourth, Kim and Weisbach 
(2008) report that for 1990-2003, the level of public equity raised (adjusted for size of the economy) is 
more than twice as high in the U.K. and Sweden than in Germany and France.  Our summary statistics are 
consistent with the differences noted above for these four countries: young U.K. and Swedish firms have 
                                                 
20
  One change was allowing foreigners to purchase stock on Swedish exchanges.  As in the U.S., Swedish banks are 
restricted from owning equity in non-financial firms, which has increased the transparency of publicly traded firms 
in Sweden and reduced the possibility of a given firm becoming dependent on a single bank for the provision of 
funds.  Sweden was also a pioneer in Europe in electronic stock market trading. 
21
 Statistics on the number of listed firms (per 10 thousand population) and stock market value traded to GDP comes 
from Beck and Demigruc-Kunt (2009). 
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considerably higher average stock issues than young German and French firms.  Furthermore, as 
expected, young firms in the U.K. and Sweden also have substantially higher R&D intensities.
22
   
VIII.  Conclusions  
Determining whether financing constraints matter for R&D is important for identifying the causal 
connections between finance and economic growth and for understanding how financing frictions 
influence real activity.  While there are strong theoretical reasons to suspect that financing constraints 
should matter for R&D, prior studies focusing on European firms tend to find weak evidence (at most) 
that financing constraints have a quantitatively important impact on R&D.  Utilizing a broad sample of 
European firms, we also find little or no evidence that finance matters for R&D if we look only at the 
R&D-cash flow sensitivity, consistent with the approach in nearly all studies of finance and R&D.  
However, when we expand the analysis to include stock issues as a source of funds and changes in cash 
holdings to control for endogenous R&D smoothing, our findings show that access to internal and 
external equity finance matters a great deal for R&D, particularly in firms most likely to face binding 
financing constraints.  The main reason for this reversal of results appears to be resolving an important 
left-out variable problem:  firms facing financing frictions have strong incentives to build and utilize 
costly stocks of liquidity to keep the flow of R&D spending relatively smooth compared to transitory 
finance shocks, avoiding the very large adjustment costs associated with R&D.  Focusing on R&D 
smoothing with stocks of liquidity also allows us to introduce stronger tests for the presence of financing 
constraints.  
Our results indicate that better access to equity finance can substantially increase R&D 
investment, which has long been a key public policy goal in the EU and many other countries.  In 
particular, we show that stock markets are much more than a “sideshow” when it comes to financing 
R&D, which helps explain the very high R&D-intensities of young publicly traded firms in countries such 
                                                 
22
 Sweden has the highest R&D intensity in the EU, with business R&D spending over 3.0%, 2.5 times the EU-15 
average.  Germany and France are well below Sweden, and the UK is below all three countries.  The lower 
aggregate number in the UK is due composition:  manufacturing is the sector responsible for most of R&D spending 
but UK manufacturing is below the EU average and well below countries like Germany. For example, in 2005, 
manufacturing accounted for only 13.6 percent of GDP in the UK compared with 23.2 percent in Germany. Within 
individual sectors, however, the UK’s R&D intensity compares favorably with France and Germany (see Uppenberg 
(2009)). 
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as the U.K. and Sweden.  More generally, our study provides new micro-level evidence that is useful for 
understanding the positive link between economic growth and broad measures of stock market 
development and liberalization documented in studies like Levine and Zervos (1998), Beck and Levine 
(2002) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005): public stock markets can foster economic growth by 
directly funding the innovative activity of young, entrepreneurial firms.  
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Figure 1: Financing Hierarchy for R&D 
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Table 1:  Sample Statistics 
The sample is constructed from European manufacturing firms (SIC codes 20-39) with coverage in the Compustat 
Global database during 1995-2007.   The sample consists only of R&D reporting firms that have at least one string 
of three consecutive R&D observations.  All variables except employees are scaled by beginning-of-period total 
assets.  Cash flow is measured gross of both R&D and fixed investment by summing income before extraordinary 
items, depreciation, and R&D expenses.  Stock issues are measured net of repurchases (gross proceeds minus stock 
repurchases) and debt issues are measured as the net change in the stock of long-term debt outstanding. Firms are 
classified as young if the first year Compustat reports non-missing sales is after 1995.  All other Europe includes 
firms from all countries except the UK, Sweden, France and Germany.  Outliers in all variables are trimmed at the 
1% level. 
 
 All Europe U.K. Sweden 
 Full Young Mature Full Young Mature Full Young Mature 
Employees Mean 10607.575 3161.684 17875.277 1755.940 761.116 2669.109 10653.737 859.855 26108.303 
 Median 1570.000 479.000 4845.000 582.500 202.000 1477.000 610.000 215.000 14335.000 
Capex Mean 0.058 0.056 0.060 0.051 0.050 0.053 0.046 0.043 0.052 
 Median 0.045 0.037 0.051 0.038 0.032 0.043 0.035 0.027 0.048 
R&D Mean 0.085 0.120 0.044 0.115 0.170 0.049 0.097 0.129 0.036 
 Median 0.041 0.062 0.029 0.051 0.095 0.028 0.038 0.078 0.025 
Sales Mean 1.068 0.987 1.161 1.000 0.841 1.190 1.046 1.040 1.058 
 Median 1.060 0.972 1.113 1.047 0.781 1.152 1.020 1.033 1.002 
CashFlow Mean 0.125 0.109 0.143 0.098 0.066 0.134 0.094 0.062 0.154 
 Median 0.129 0.122 0.134 0.114 0.086 0.130 0.128 0.099 0.148 
StkIssues Mean 0.108 0.181 0.025 0.209 0.338 0.054 0.114 0.163 0.011 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DbtIssues Mean 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.019 0.014 0.029 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 
CashHoldings Mean 0.223 0.296 0.139 0.294 0.393 0.177 0.234 0.297 0.108 
 Median 0.114 0.151 0.091 0.152 0.232 0.106 0.124 0.159 0.068 
Firms 746 467 279 192 122 70 70 52 18 
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 Table 1:  Sample Statistics (Continued) 
 
 Germany France All Other Europe 
 Full Young Mature Full Young Mature Full Young Mature 
Employees Mean 14869.127 2574.144 28894.706 28399.528 10281.184 39073.902 9489.839 4024.526 14752.579 
 Median 2130.000 570.000 8430.000 6250.000 515.000 12730.000 2180.000 800.000 5330.000 
Capex Mean 0.067 0.062 0.073 0.059 0.052 0.064 0.062 0.063 0.060 
 Median 0.049 0.039 0.059 0.052 0.036 0.061 0.047 0.045 0.049 
R&D Mean 0.074 0.098 0.042 0.069 0.103 0.042 0.072 0.097 0.044 
 Median 0.051 0.069 0.034 0.031 0.043 0.027 0.035 0.046 0.028 
Sales Mean 1.154 1.038 1.296 1.045 0.966 1.101 1.089 1.052 1.130 
 Median 1.139 1.031 1.260 1.048 0.958 1.093 1.045 1.002 1.067 
CashFlow Mean 0.137 0.130 0.147 0.120 0.112 0.127 0.145 0.142 0.149 
 Median 0.139 0.144 0.136 0.115 0.100 0.123 0.135 0.135 0.135 
StkIssues Mean 0.076 0.129 0.011 0.059 0.126 0.011 0.067 0.112 0.019 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DbtIssues Mean 0.013 0.008 0.019 0.009 0.003 0.014 0.018 0.020 0.016 
 Median 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
CashHoldings Mean 0.192 0.265 0.104 0.177 0.265 0.115 0.200 0.253 0.143 
 Median 0.100 0.153 0.067 0.098 0.120 0.092 0.108 0.125 0.095 
Firms 116 74 42 72 37 35 296 182 114 
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Table 2:  Dynamic R&D Regressions 
Estimation is by systems GMM with lagged levels dated t-3 to t-4 used as instruments for the equation in differences 
and lagged differences dated t-2 used as instruments for the equation in levels.  Fixed firm and time effects are 
included in all regressions.  The sample is described in Table 1.  Outliers in all regression variables are trimmed at 
the 1% level.  Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation are reported in 
parenthesis.   
 
Dependent Variable:  (R&D)t 
 
 All Europe U.K. Sweden 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(R&D)t-1 0.966 0.979 0.872 0.844 1.122 1.007 0.878 1.114 1.021 
 (0.191) (0.147) (0.113) (0.165) (0.161) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.081) 
(R&D)t-1
2 -0.641 -0.503 -0.493 -0.595 -0.656 -0.600 -0.288 -0.474 -0.457 
 (0.277) (0.178) (0.147) (0.239) (0.193) (0.154) (0.146) (0.157) (0.120) 
(Q)t 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.028 0.021 0.012 0.010 0.003 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
(Sales) t-1 -0.062 -0.048 -0.046 -0.056 -0.027 -0.029 -0.026 -0.020 -0.013 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
(CashFlow)t -0.009 0.054 0.137 0.031 0.089 0.163 0.015 0.031 0.096 
 (0.060) (0.041) (0.035) (0.061) (0.048) (0.034) (0.041) (0.032) (0.044) 
(CashFlow)t-1 0.019 -0.008 0.039 0.050 -0.029 0.038 0.005 -0.028 -0.003 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.042) (0.050) (0.055) (0.044) (0.038) (0.025) (0.027) 
(StkIssues)t  0.073 0.198  0.047 0.175  0.043 0.137 
  (0.015) (0.041)  (0.016) (0.044)  (0.017) (0.030) 
(StkIssues)t-1  -0.074 -0.067  -0.083 -0.061  -0.075 -0.013 
  (0.020) (0.027)  (0.020) (0.023)  (0.013) (0.028) 
(ΔCashHoldings)t   -0.134   -0.131   -0.131 
   (0.042)   (0.047)   (0.033) 
(ΔCashHoldings)t-1   -0.008   -0.024   -0.082 
   (0.031)   (0.032)   (0.030) 
Sum CashFlow (p-value)
 0.877 0.519 0.002 0.212 0.294 0.002 0.577 0.926 0.046 
Sum StkIssues (p-value)  0.989 0.003  0.234 0.011  0.083 0.012 
Sum ΔCashHoldings (p-value)   0.003   0.003   0.000 
m2 0.29 -1.02 -0.04 0.16 -1.43 -0.58 0.93 0.36 0.08 
J-test (p-value)
 0.369 0.597 0.703 0.257 0.323 0.805 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)
 0.295 0.775 0.763 0.277 0.659 0.945 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Observations 3,977 3,746 3,694 931 873 844 453 437 427 
Firms 725 716 705 185 184 176 69 69 69 
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Table 2:  Dynamic R&D Regressions (Continued) 
 
 Germany France All Other Europe 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(R&D)t-1 1.302 0.897 0.853 1.249 1.150 1.016 1.112 0.946 0.941 
 (0.230) (0.123) (0.111) (0.142) (0.092) (0.109) (0.144) (0.173) (0.153) 
(R&D)t-1
2 -1.322 -0.060 -0.206 -0.942 -0.782 -0.788 -0.732 -0.561 -0.597 
 (0.402) (0.256) (0.201) (0.328) (0.292) (0.308) (0.169) (0.169) (0.141) 
(Q)t 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
(Sales) t-1 -0.022 -0.023 -0.011 -0.046 -0.027 -0.019 -0.049 -0.045 -0.036 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) 
(CashFlow)t 0.109 0.089 0.099 0.209 0.071 0.094 0.097 0.130 0.171 
 (0.042) (0.029) (0.028) (0.171) (0.044) (0.050) (0.060) (0.038) (0.043) 
(CashFlow)t-1 -0.072 -0.055 -0.048 -0.126 -0.103 -0.052 0.035 -0.013 -0.005 
 (0.052) (0.037) (0.031) (0.117) (0.091) (0.060) (0.087) (0.056) (0.047) 
(StkIssues)t  0.109 0.184  0.091 0.107  0.148 0.173 
  (0.029) (0.024)  (0.027) (0.050)  (0.030) (0.052) 
(StkIssues)t-1  -0.097 -0.032  -0.028 0.039  -0.070 -0.022 
  (0.030) (0.026)  (0.032) (0.052)  (0.046) (0.042) 
(ΔCashHoldings)t   -0.100   -0.061   -0.055 
   (0.024)   (0.055)   (0.055) 
(ΔCashHoldings)t-1   -0.059   -0.072   -0.057 
   (0.027)   (0.046)   (0.030) 
Sum CashFlow (p-value)
 0.543 0.389 0.042 0.342 0.699 0.383 0.078 0.074 0.005 
Sum StkIssues (p-value)  0.825 0.000  0.167 0.099  0.102 0.015 
Sum ΔCashHoldings (p-value)   0.000   0.134   0.102 
m2 1.98 0.29 0.77 1.93 -1.28 -1.47 -1.24 0.91 -0.26 
J-test (p-value)
 0.956 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.097 0.105 0.289 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)
 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.115 0.180 0.307 
Observations 625 599 596 369 356 353 1,599 1,481 1,474 
Firms 114 113 113 71 71 70 286 279 277 
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Table 3:  Sample Splits All Europe 
Estimation is by systems GMM with lagged levels dated t-3 to t-4 used as instruments for the equation in differences 
and lagged differences dated t-2 used as instruments for the equation in levels.  Fixed firm and time effects are 
included in all regressions.  The sample is described in Table 1.  Outliers in all regression variables are trimmed at 
the 1% level.  Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation are reported in 
parenthesis below the coefficient estimates on the lagged R&D terms, Q, and sales.  P-values from tests that the sum 
of the coefficients is equal to zero are reported in parenthesis below the financial variables.     
 
Dependent Variable:  (R&D)t 
 
 Young Mature Small Large 
Low  
Dividend 
High 
Dividend 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(R&D)t-1 0.884 1.017 0.904 1.043 0.864 1.009 
 (0.124) (0.068) (0.123) (0.135) (0.122) (0.100) 
(R&D)t-1
2 -0.466 -1.196 -0.498 -1.228 -0.503 -0.159 
 (0.158) (0.135) (0.154) (0.176) (0.141) (0.263) 
(Q)t 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.009 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
(Sales) t-1 -0.045 -0.012 -0.041 -0.007 -0.043 -0.020 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.013) (0.002) (0.013) (0.007) 
Sum CashFlow 0.202 0.029 0.188 0.070 0.170 -0.013 
(p-value) (0.001) (0.427) (0.001) (0.258) (0.003) (0.725) 
Sum StkIssues 0.167 0.029 0.141 0.001 0.125 -0.018 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.332) (0.001) (0.991) (0.005) (0.645) 
Sum ΔCashHoldings -0.221 -0.057 -0.172 -0.029 -0.128 -0.045 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.686) (0.013) (0.258) 
m2 -0.01 -0.41 -0.02 -0.04 0.17 -0.08 
J-test (p-value)
 0.647 0.297 0.764 0.665 0.347 0.836 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)
 0.696 0.237 0.784 0.485 0.388 0.956 
Observations 1,888 1,806 2,487 1,207 2,722 972 
Firms 434 271 523 182 529 176 
Table 4:  Sample Splits by Country 
Estimation is by systems GMM with lagged levels dated t-3 to t-4 used as instruments for the equation in differences and lagged differences dated t-2 used as 
instruments for the equation in levels.  Fixed firm and time effects are included in all regressions.  The sample is described in Table 1.  Outliers in all regression 
variables are trimmed at the 1% level.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation; p-values from tests that the sum of the 
coefficients is equal to zero are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 U.K. Sweden Germany France All Other Europe 
Panel A:  Sample Split Based on Age 
 Young Mature Young Mature Young Mature Young Mature Young Mature 
Sum CashFlow 0.244 -0.024 0.126 -0.001 0.067 0.051 0.011 -0.002 0.178 0.085 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.297) (0.012) (0.960) (0.004) (0.009) (0.770) (0.915) (0.005) (0.045) 
Sum StkIssues 0.125 -0.011 0.130 -0.069 0.130 0.054 -0.009 -0.049 0.157 -0.005 
(p-value) (0.017) (0.665) (0.013) (0.106) (0.001) (0.080) (0.861) (0.205) (0.009) (0.915) 
Sum ΔCashHoldings -0.173 -0.055 -0.214 -0.012 -0.133 -0.124 -0.023 0.027 -0.131 -0.021 
(p-value) (0.006) (0.145) (0.000) (0.592) (0.007) (0.000) (0.552) (0.303) (0.045) (0.550) 
m2 -0.95 -0.67 0.02 0.89 0.54 2.17 -1.39 -1.28 -0.64 0.32 
J-test (p-value)
 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.891 1.000 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)
 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996 1.000 
Observations 415 429 260 167 337 259 149 204 727 747 
Firms 107 69 51 18 73 40 36 34 167 110 
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Panel B:  Sample Split Based on Size 
 Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Sum CashFlow 0.199 -0.022 0.095 0.037 0.071 0.040 0.016 0.022 0.150 0.133 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.103) (0.036) (0.306) (0.009) (0.064) (0.606) (0.190) (0.017) (0.000) 
Sum StkIssues 0.112 -0.199 0.110 -0.012 0.131 -0.012 -0.038 -0.084 0.153 0.036 
(p-value) (0.011) (0.000) (0.042) (0.744) (0.002) (0.683) (0.379) (0.002) (0.010) (0.669) 
Sum ΔCashHoldings -0.154 -0.032 -0.198 -0.049 -0.127 -0.123 0.001 0.006 -0.119 0.054 
(p-value) (0.004) (0.082) (0.000) (0.001) (0.018) (0.000) (0.960) (0.734) (0.053) (0.302) 
m2 -0.68 -1.13 0.07 0.76 0.43 1.52 -1.23 -0.66 -0.36 -0.08 
J-test (p-value)
 0.983 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.808 1.000 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)
 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 
Observations 750 94 300 127 354 242 160 193 923 551 
Firms 159 17 55 14 75 38 40 30 194 83 
Panel C:  Sample Split Based on Dividend Payout 
 Low Div High Div Low Div High Div Low Div High Div Low Div High Div Low Div High Div 
Sum CashFlow 0.148 -0.017 0.113 -0.004 0.079 -0.068 0.054 -0.162 0.170 0.100 
(p-value) (0.001) (0.369) (0.010) (0.849) (0.005) (0.096) (0.271) (0.001) (0.015) (0.018) 
Sum StkIssues 0.063 -0.064 0.134 -0.053 0.115 0.142 0.161 0.297 0.153 -0.017 
(p-value) (0.107) (0.000) (0.010) (0.065) (0.002) (0.005) (0.071) (0.016) (0.017) (0.548) 
Sum ΔCashHoldings -0.112 0.025 -0.228 -0.059 -0.061 -0.197 -0.146 -0.007 -0.135 -0.033 
(p-value) (0.021) (0.457) (0.000) (0.027) (0.029) (0.000) (0.107) (0.889) (0.047) (0.203) 
m2 -0.53 -1.53 0.03 -0.90 0.59 -0.12 -1.53 0.42 0.08 -0.51 
J-test (p-value)
 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.563 1.000 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)
 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.691 1.000 
Observations 575 269 325 102 515 81 306 47 1,001 473 
Firms 125 51 53 16 96 17 59 11 196 81 
Table 5:  Alternative Estimates:  Pooled Sample 
Estimation is by systems GMM on the full Europe sample described in Table 1.  Fixed firm and time 
effects are included in all regressions.  The sample is described in Table 1.  Outliers in all regression 
variables are trimmed at the 1% level.  Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial 
correlation are reported in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates on the lagged R&D terms, Q, and 
sales.  P-values from tests that the sum of the coefficients is equal to zero are reported in parenthesis below 
the financial variables.     
 
Dependent Variable:  (R&D)t 
 
 
t-2 to t-4 instruments 
 
Replace Q with sales 
growth 
Add New Debt Issues 
 
 Young Mature Young Mature Young Mature 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(R&D)t-1 0.818 1.083 0.786 1.036 0.849 1.235 
 (0.102) (0.045) (0.138) (0.088) (0.129) (0.132) 
(R&D)t-1
2 -0.514 -1.299 -0.321 -1.292 -0.421 -2.213 
 (0.121) (0.064) (0.201) (0.150) (0.171) (0.561) 
(Q)t 0.008 0.003   0.007 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002)   (0.003) (0.002) 
(Sales) t-1 -0.054 -0.007 -0.049 -0.016 -0.042 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) 
(SalesGrowth)t   0.028 0.018   
   (0.019) (0.011)   
Sum CashFlow 0.199 0.020 0.261 0.054 0.175 -0.004 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.360) (0.001) (0.091) (0.002) (0.879) 
Sum StkIssues 0.166 0.031 0.175 0.069 0.186 0.026 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.162) (0.000) (0.069) (0.000) (0.284) 
Sum ΔCashHoldings -0.178 -0.041 -0.216 -0.089 -0.218 -0.061 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.141) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.036) 
Sum NewDebt     -0.081 0.004 
(p-value)     (0.363) (0.873) 
m2 -0.86 -0.21 0.24 -0.61 -0.84 -0.28 
J-test (p-value)
 0.472 0.448 0.723 0.557 0.723 0.531 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)
 0.189 0.475 0.334 0.673 0.829 0.577 
Observations 1,888 1,806 1,965 1,906 1,807 1,774 
Firms 434 271 437 277 423 271 
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Table A1:  Firm and Observation Count by Country 
Table A1 reports the number of firms and observations from each country in the sample.  The count is 
based on the number of firms and observations each country contributes to the baseline regression that 
includes only cash flow.  The number of observations declines slightly as additional financial variables are 
included in the specification. 
 
 Firms Observations 
UK 185 931 
Germany 114 625 
France 71 369 
Sweden 69 453 
Switzerland 64 414 
Finland 51 333 
Denmark 27 160 
Netherlands 25 167 
Turkey 25 102 
Belgium 22 115 
Norway 19 73 
Greece 16 71 
Italy 13 43 
Ireland 11 82 
Austria 10 33 
Spain 3 6 
 725 3977 
 
 
